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OBTAINING POLITICAL ASYLUM: 
CLASSIFYING RAPE AS A WELL-FOUNDED 
FEAR OF PERSECUTION ON ACCOUNT OF 
POLITICAL OPINION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 1984 Sofia Campos-Guardado, a Salvadoran woman, 
took a bus trip to the home of her uncle, the chairman of a local 
agricultural cooperative. l The cooperative was formed as part of 
the controversial land reform movement in El Salvador.2 The pur-
pose of Campos-Guardado's visit was to repay a debt her father 
owed to her uncle. 3 While Campos-Guardado was visiting her un-
cle's home, a group of guerrilla fighters, an older woman, and two 
men broke into the house.4 The intruders dragged Campos-Guar-
dado, her three female cousins, one male cousin, and her uncle to 
a farm pit near the house.5 The attackers tied and gagged the 
women. Then, with machetes, the attackers cut the flesh from the 
men's bodies and finally shot them to death. 6 The perpetrators 
forced the gagged and bound women to watch their actions. 7 After 
killing the men, the male attackers raped Campos-Guardado and 
her cousins while the older woman who was part of the attacking 
group shouted political slogans.s After raping the women, the men 
untied the women, and threatened to kill them unless they fled. 9 
After this attack, Campos-Guardado suffered a nervous break-
down and was hospitalized for fifteen days.lO She was afraid to go 
I Sofia Campos-Guardado v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 809 F.2d 285, 287 
(5th Cir. 1987). 
2 [d. 
3 [d. 
4 [d.; Campos-Guardado introduced evidence to show that both guerrillas and military 
personnel extort monies from agricultural cooperatives. At the time of the rape, Campos-
Guardado had no knowledge to which group her attackers belonged. Respondent's Brief in 
Opposition to Certiorari at 2, Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (No. 
86-1969) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief] (On file with the Boston College Third World 
Law Journal). 
5 Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 287. 
6 [d. 
7 [d. 
8 [d.; Campos-Guardado's original claim did not specify exactly what slogans were being 
shouted. Respondent's Brief at 2, Campos-Guardado (No. 86-1969). 
9 Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 287. 
10 [d. 
355 
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back to her home and found work in a new city, San Salvador.ll 
Later, on her first visit home to her parents, Campos-Guardado was 
introduced to two cousins whom her mother claimed had just es-
caped from the guerrillas. 12 Campos-Guardado recognized one of 
the cousins as one of her assailants. 13 During her visit, whenever 
she left the house, the assailant followed Campos-Guardado, stole 
her money, and on numerous occasions threatened to kill her and 
her family if she were ever to reveal his identity as her rapist. 14 
After this incident Campos-Guardado was afraid to return to her 
hometown. 15 Fearing retribution, Campos-Guardado left EI Salva-
dor and fled to the United States. 16 Upon her arrival in the United 
States she applied for political asylum. 17 
Sofia Campos-Guardado's experience is not unique. Olimpia 
Lazo-Majano was also repeatedly tortured through rape in EI Sal-
vador. 18 Her persecutor was a sergeant with the Fuerza Armada, the 
army of EI Salvador.19 Lazo-Majano had worked washing clothes 
and doing other domestic work for five years. In April of 1982 
Rene Zuniga, a sergeant with the Fuerza Armada and a man Lazo-
Majano had known since childhood, asked her to wash his clothes.20 
Lazo-Majano agreed and on her days off worked for Zuniga.21 
During the six weeks that Lazo-Majano worked for Zuniga he bru-
tally tortured her through rape and beatings.22 Zuniga first raped 
Lazo-Majano at gunpoint; other times he held hand grenades to 
her forehead threatening to explode them if she resisted his ad-
vances.23 Zuniga threatened to "have [Lazo-Majano's] tongue cut 
off, her nails removed one by one, her eyes pulled out" and then 
II Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit at 4, Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1969) [herein-
after Petition for Certiorari]. 
12 Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 287. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.; Brief for Respondent at 3, Campos-Guardado (No. 86-1969). 
15 Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 287. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Olimpia Lazo-Majano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 813 F.2d 1432, 1433 
(9th Cir. 1987). 
19 Id. The Fuerza Armada is the armed force which is the Salvadoran Military. Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
1990] POLITICAL ASYLUM: RAPE 357 
kill her and her children if she told anyone of his actions.24 He also 
threatened to denounce her as a subversive.25 Lazo-Majano was 
unable to escape this brutalization while she remained in El Salva-
dor. She believed that the power of the armed forces was so strong, 
that they would support Zuniga's actions of rape and allow him to 
carry out his threats of killing her for exposing him.26 Lazo-Majano 
left El Salvador, came to the United States and applied for political 
asylum.27 
Both Campos-Guardado and Lazo-Majano were denied asylum 
by an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA).2B Lazo-Majano ultimately won an appeal in the Ninth Cir-
cuit;29 the Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed Campos-Guardado's de-
nial of asylum.30 The Ninth Circuit denied a Petition for Rehearing 
in the Lazo-Majano case and the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in the Campos-Guardado matter.3! This leaves a conflict in the circuit 
courts as to whether rape may be considered a "well founded fear 
of persecution on account of political opinion."32 
This Note will address the conflict in the circuit courts by 
examining whether there is supporting case law for claiming rape 
as a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 
To begin, this Note in Part II will examine the legislative history 
and judicial interpretation of the statutory language governing asy-
24 Id.; Response to Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en banc at 4, 
Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-7384) [hereinafter Response to 
Petition for Rehearing]. 
25 Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1433. 
26 Id.; Response to Petition for Rehearing at 4-5, Lazo-Majano (No. 85-7384). This was 
not just Lazo-Majano's belief. In reality, no military officer in El Salvador had ever been 
convicted of a human rights abuse against another Salvadoran at this time. Orantes-Hernan-
dez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1988). 
27 Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1433, 1434. 
28 See Appendix C to Petition for Certiorari, Campos-Guardado (86-1969); Lazo-Majano, 
813 F.2d at 1433-34. In the United States when a claim for political asylum is first heard it 
is brought before an Immigration Judge. The decision of the Immigration Judge may be 
appealed and reviewed de novo by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Cases are 
appealed from the BIA to the circuit courts. 
29 Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1432. 
30 Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 285. 
31 Response to Petition for Rehearing, Lazo-Majano (No. 85-7384); Campos-Guardado 
v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987). 
32 The Refugee Act contains guidelines for withholding of deportation and granting of 
asylum. To be granted asylum an applicant must be a refugee who has a well founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1l01(a)(42), l253(h)(1982). 
358 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:355 
lum claims. Part III will then discuss the BIA and the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuit Courts' analyses in the Campos-Guardado and Lazo-
Majano cases. That examination will show that there is sufficient 
statutory and case law support for rape in particular circumstances 
to be considered a fear of persecution on account of political opin-
ion. Once it has been established that a legal argument can be made 
for granting political asylum when persecution is in the form of 
rape, the second part of this Note examines why the BIA in its 
decisions may not be coming to that conclusion. Part IV is a critique 
of the policies of the BIA and brings to light the cultural biases, 
including the latent sexism, that bind the BIA opinions. 
II. THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 
A. Background 
The immigration policy of the United States is directed through 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).33 Under this legislation, 
there are three classes of applicants allowed to immigrate perma-
nently to the United States: people with family ties, people needed 
to fulfill labor needs, and those with refugee status.34 The Refugee 
Act of 1980 (Refugee Act) is an amendment to the Immigration 
and Nationality Act that specifically addresses the treatment of ref-
ugees.35 Although the Refugee Act establishes the law for action 
with both "overseas refugees"36 and "political asylees,"37 this discus-
sion of the Refugee Act will focus on the segments which address 
refugees seeking political asylum.38 
33 The Act was originally passed in 1952, with subsequent amendments in 1962, 1965, 
and 1980. 
34 ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 642 (1985). There are 
numerical quotas for the number of people allowed to settle permanently in the United 
States each year. At this time the number is 270,000. Eighty percent of the positions are for 
those with family ties, twenty percent are allocated to those who fulfill labor needs. [d. at 
101. The determination for refugees is a separate process. Refugees are divided into two 
categories. The first, "refugees," are people in refugee camps who apply for asylum from 
outside of the United States. These applications are reviewed and decided on before the 
applicant comes to the United States. This is the Overseas Refugee Program. [d. at 618. The 
second, "asylees," are applicants who have entered the United States, and subsequently try 
to prevent involuntary return by applying for political asylum. [d. at 619, 638. 
35 The Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-59, 1253(h), 1521-1524 
(1982). For definition that applicant must comply with to be granted asylum see supra note 
32. 
36 See supra note 34. 
37 [d. 
38 Refugees seeking political asylum are defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
1990] POLITICAL ASYLUM: RAPE 359 
B. Legislative History 
In 1952, the INA39 contained no definite provisions regarding 
admission of refugees.4o Refugees were admitted by "special enact-
ments" that were not a codified part of the admissions procedure.41 
Refugees were admitted through the discretionary power of the 
Attorney General, who could, in emergency situations, allow tem-
porary entry to applicants for humanitarian reasons.42 After the 
danger had passed for the alien, however, she was put back into 
the same situation as before the grant and once again entered the 
queue with all the other applicants for admission to the United 
States.43 These special enactments tended to be highly discrimina-
tory favoring refugees fleeing from a communist dominated or 
Middle Eastern country.44 
The first movement toward defining a nondiscriminatory policy 
came in 1962 with the enactment of the Migration and Refugee 
Assistance Act.45 This act omitted the dominant requirement that 
the refugee must be fleeing a communist-dominated country.46 In 
1965, for the first time in a statute, amendments to the INA pro-
vided an outline for the admission of refugeesY The amendments 
were the most expansive yet, but were still limited by geography 
and ideology.48 From 1976 to 1980, various bills aimed at immigra-
tion reform appeared in Congress. These bills focused on a new 
definition of refugee and on how the admission of refugees was to 
39 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101-407,66 Stat. 163 (1952), 
(codified as amended, at 8 U.S.c. §§ llOl(a)(42), 1253(h)(1982)). 
40 A refugee is a victim of war, persecution or natural disaster. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, 
see supra note 34. This is not the definition of refugee as codified in the Refugee Act of 1980. 
See infra note 61. 
41 Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 
19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 14 (1981). 
42 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(1952) (Amended 1980). 
43 1d. 
44 In 1953 the Refugee Relief Act was passed codifying parts of the "special enactments." 
This act allowed victims of natural disaster and refugees from communist-dominated coun-
tries to enter the United States. The Act was amended in 1957 to read that relief would be 
extended to "victims of racial, religious, or political persecution who were from communist 
or communist-dominated countries or a country in the Middle East." Pub. L. No. 85-316, 
71 Stat. 639 (1957), cited in Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 14. 
45 Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 16, n.32. 
46 /d. at 17. "[T]he statute also broadened our national perspective on the origin and 
cause of refugee movements, and implied our willingness to assist all who had fled their 
homes." 1d. 
47 See Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 10, n.4 and accompanying text. 
48 1d. at 18. 
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be controlled.49 The debate on the treatment of refugees between 
1976 and the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 emphasized a 
reform of refugee law, based on a humanitarian foundation, as 
opposed to one made up of ideological preferences. 50 
In 1968, the United States signed the United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol).51 The Protocol re-
quires the United States to implement laws and decrees issued by 
the United Nations regarding refugees.52 By signing the Protocol, 
the United States bound itself to follow the decree of the United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.53 There was 
pressure in Congress for the United States to align itself with this 
international Protocol.54 The resulting bill, the Refugee Act of 1980, 
includes a definition of refugee that closely conforms with the 
United Nations Convention definition. 55 
In passing the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress established a 
codified procedure for enabling a humanitarian response to the 
problem of refugees. 56 The Refugee Act, the result of thirty years 
49 Id. at 20. 
50 Id. at 20-30. 
51 ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 34, at 639. 
52 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 19 U.S.T. 6223 T.I.A.S. 
No. 6577. Cited in Anker and Posner, supra note 41. 
53 Id. 
54 See discussion related to debate on House and Senate floors in Anker & Posner, supra 
note 41, at 22-23, 25. Note that during the final House debates on the 1980 bill, Congressman 
Rodino described the bill as "one of the most important pieces of humanitarian legislation 
ever enacted by a United States Congress." S. Rep No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980), 
as quoted in Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 63. 
55 Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 43. The United Nations Convention determined 
that a refugee was a person with a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. U.N. 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. For 
a discussion of the definition of refugee in the Refugee Act of 1980 see note 61. 
56 For a detailed summary of the legislative history and a review of the debates sur-
rounding the humanitarian importance of the Act see generally Anker & Posner, supra note 
41. Note also that during debates previous to the adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980, 
Congress heard testimony from human rights groups regarding crafting the wording of the 
bill. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2816 before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and Inter-
national Law of the House Committee of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) at 24-25. 
Amnesty International testified that it was important to determine if refugees were from "a 
country wherein there exists a pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights." Id. at 174. Initially, the phrasing proposed was that allocations were to be made for 
refugees with "special concerns." Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 47. The House Committee 
changed this to read "special humanitarian concerns," thereby emphasizing the "plight of 
the refugees themselves as opposed to national origins or political considerations .... " Id. 
at 54. See also Gibney, A "Well-Founded Fear" of Persecution, 10 HUM. RTs. Q. 109, III (1988). 
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of negotiating, compromising, and periodic interim legislation,57 
gives the United States a tool for responding to a refugee's request 
for relief from human rights violations. 58 
C. The Language of the Statute 
Under the Refugee Act the standard for granting asylum is a 
discretionary function of the Attorney General. 59 The Attorney 
General may grant asylum to any alien within the borders of the 
United States if the Attorney General determines that the alien is a 
refugee. 6D 
A refugee is defined as a person with a well founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group or political opinion.6l What becomes 
important in this definition is determining what defines a "well-
founded fear of persecution" and for the cases discussed in this 
Note, what is a "political opinion." 
57 See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 11-42. 
58 This may not guarantee that the Act is always implemented fairly, but it does provide 
a structural design that allows for humanitarian issues to be considered in a refugee'S 
application. 
59 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(I). An applicant who has been granted asylum can apply for 
permanent residency in the United States after one year. 8 U.S.C.§ 1159(b). 
60 INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)(42)(A). In applying for asylum, 
the petitioner files an application with the District Director of the INS for the District she is 
in. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 34, at 642. If exclusion or deportation proceedings 
have not been initiated, the request is first heard by the district office. The district office 
interviews the applicant and then requests an opinion from the State Department on the 
matter.ld. After the advice from the State Department is received, the District Officer makes 
a decision. The decision cannot be appealed. ld. at 642-643. If the request is denied, the 
applicant can reintroduce her claim to the Immigration Judge once exclusion or deportation 
proceedings have commenced. The Judge then reviews the matter de novo. ld. at 643. If 
exclusion or deportation hearings have begun before the claim for asylum is filed, then the 
claim is heard first by the Immigration Judge, not the District Office. The decision of the 
Immigration Judge can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The decision of 
the BIA is appealable to either the federal district court, if an exclusion proceeding took 
place, or the appeals court if the hearing was for withholding of deportation. [d. In 96% of 
the cases examined, the Immigration Judge'S decision and the State Department Advisory 
opinions were the same. 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES at 370 (1988). 
6) The full text of the definition is as follows: "any person who is outside any country 
of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any 
country in which such person last habitually resided and who is unwilling to return to, and 
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because 
of persecution or a well founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 110 1 (a)(42)(A). 
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D. Judicial Interpretation of the Statute 
1. Defining A Well-Founded Fear of Persecution 
The Supreme Court, in Cardoza-Fonseca,62 held that the inter-
pretation of "well-founded fear" should parallel the interpretation 
in the United Nations Protocol. 63 The United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees,64 states that "the expression well 
founded fear of being the victim of persecution ... means that a 
person either has been actually a victim of persecution or can show 
good reason why he fears persecution."65 The Cardoza-Fonseca Court 
states that fear can be well-founded with a less than fifty percent 
chance of the event taking place.66 The Court determined that well-
founded fear is a subjective standard and did not set out a substan-
tive definition.67 Although the Supreme Court did not specifically 
define fear and left its interpretation to "the process of case by case 
adjudication by the INS,"68 it did set some guidelines. The Court 
stated that the "reference to fear makes the asylum eligibility de-
termination turn to some extent on the alien's subjective mental 
state .... "69 
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, 
the BIA in Matter of Mogharrabi 70 adopted an interpretation of well-
founded fear of persecution that paralleled the Fifth Circuit's def-
inition.71 The Fifth Circuit, in Guevara v. Flores, held that the well-
founded fear standard has subjective and objective components and 
that "an alien possesses a well founded fear of persecution if a 
reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution if 
she were to be returned to her native country."72 The BIA, in 
62 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987). 
63 [d. at 1216. 
64 189 V.N.T.S. 150 (july 28, 1951), cited in Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1216. 
65 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1216. 
66 [d. at 1213. This standard is different than the standard used to determine whether 
an alien's life or freedom would be threatened in their home country in determining a 
withholding of deportation claim. In deportation claims the applicant must have a "clear 
probability of persecution" showing it is "more likely than not that the alien would suffer 
persecution." INS v. Stevie, 467 V.S. 407, 429-30 (1984). The deportation standard imposes 
a greater burden on the applicant than the asylum standard. 
67 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1223. 
68 [d. 
69 [d. at 1208. 
70 Interim Decision 3028 (BIA 1987). 
71 [d. at 7. 
72 Guevara v. Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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Mogharrabi, stated its definition of well-founded fear would be that 
"an applicant for asylum has established a well founded fear of 
persecution if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances 
would fear persecution."73 
Determining when an applicant has "fear" of persecution is one 
step. Defining "persecution," however, is a separate step within the 
process.74 The Ninth Circuit in Kovac v. INS,75 defines persecution 
as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ ... 
in a way regarded as offensive."76 Reviewing the legislative history, 
the Kovac court determined that neither physical harm nor threat-
ened bodily harm is necessary to determine that an applicant suffers 
from a fear of persecution. 77 
Even if an asylum applicant demonstrates that she has a 
well-founded fear of persecution, she then must demonstrate 
that it is "on account of" one of the five factors enumerated 
in the Act. 78 The factor that this Note examines is political 
opmIOn. 
73 Matter of Mogharrabi, Interim Decision 3028 (BIA 1987), effectively overruled Matter 
of Acosta where the BIA held that the clear probability and well-founded fear standards were not 
meaningfully different, and were to be treated the same. See Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision 
2986 (BIA 1985), at 25 (emphasis added). 
74 See In re: Mohammed Osman Mohibi, unpublished BIA decision, July 27, 1987. An 
Afghani citizen applied for asylum asserting that his father and brother had been arrested 
and imprisoned in Afghanistan. Id. at 3. The applicant claimed that his father and brother 
were imprisoned because they were members of the Hizbeh Islami, a group resisting the 
Soviet-dominated Afghanistan government. The applicant feared for his own safety and was 
also a member of the Hizbeh Islami. He stated that he was asked to join the communist party 
once or twice a month. Id. The BIA granted asylum to Mohibi, stating that their criteria for 
establishing well-founded fear of persecution is to show that "a reasonable person in his 
circumstances would fear persecution." Id. at 2. The BIA states that it must consider the 
"totality of circumstances." Id. at 6; contrast with In re: Juan Angel Maldonado-Cruz, Interim 
Decision (BIA 1988). Maldonado-Cruz, a Salvadoran citizen applied for asylum because he 
was kidnapped by and forced to join a guerrilla group, then participate in an operation 
against his village. Id. at 3. A friend was killed trying to escape from the guerrilla forces. 
Maldonado-Cruz escaped, and soon after heard that guerrilla members were looking for 
him. He feared they would kill him for deserting them. Id. The BIA states that in the 
kidnapping of the applicant, "It does not appear that there were any elements of persecution 
in this encounter ... the guerrillas wanted him to be a member of their group." Id. at 5-6. 
The BIA goes on to state that punishment of deserters is an "essential element of control" 
in preventing people from leaving the group. Id. at 8. The applicant was denied asylum. Id. 
at 12. 
75 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969). 
76 Kovac, 407 F.2d at 107. 
77 Id. at 106. See also 111 Congo Rec., pI. 16 at 21804 (August 25, 1965), where Con-
gressman Hoff in discussing the proposed clause "physical persecution" deemed it too narrow 
of a phrase. 
78 Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 35. 
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2. Defining Political Opinion 
"Political opinion" has been clearly defined in the Ninth Circuit 
by two cases.79 In Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, Adela Hernandez-Ortiz 
fled to the United States from El Salvador.80 In 1982, the BIA 
denied her request for withholding of deportation. A petition for 
review was filed which stayed the deportation order, but Hernan-
dez-Ortiz was deported back to El Salvador by mistake.81 Although 
the United States made arrangements for Hernandez-Ortiz to leave 
El Salvador and return to the United States until her request for 
rehearing occurred, she had difficulty getting out of El Salvador. 
Hernandez-Ortiz had to pay a Salvadoran immigration official $200 
in order to leave.82 While Hernandez-Ortiz was in El Salvador, her 
grandparents' store was robbed at gunpoint by Salvadoran soldiers, 
her brother and sister-in-law were murdered by Salvadoran security 
forces, and her brother-in-law's wife was kidnapped by members of 
the Salvadoran National Guard.83 Due to her return to El Salvador 
by the United States and these events involving her family, Her-
nandez-Ortiz felt she was a target of the Salvadoran government. 84 
In 1983, Hernandez-Ortiz submitted a motion to reopen her de-
portation proceeding and at the same time filed an application for 
asylum.85 Upon review, the BIA denied Hernandez-Ortiz's appeal 
stating that her fears only concerned '''the political upheaval and 
random violence' in El Salvador and that" her claim had nothing 
to do with her political opinion.86 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the BIA decision.87 The court ruled that 
where a government is inflicting the harm, the activities are taking 
place in a political context.88 The decision stated: 
In this case it is the forces of the government that are inflicting 
the threats and violence. When a government exerts its military 
strength against an individual or a group within its population 
and there is no reason to believe that the individual or group 
79 Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez 
v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1324-26 (9th Cir. 1984). 
80 Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 512. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
8' Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 513. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 519. 
88 Id. at 516. 
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has engaged in any criminal activity or other conduct that would 
provide a legitimate basis for governmental action, the most 
reasonable presumption is that the government's actions are 
politically motivated.89 
365 
The Hernandez-Ortiz court stressed that a government does not per-
secute those who share in its ideologies,90 and that "it is irrelevant 
whether a victim actually possesses any of these opinions as long as 
the government believes that he does."91 Thus, the determination 
of what is "political" need not focus solely on the actions of the 
applicant. Argueta v. INS92 holds that in determining what is political, 
courts can focus on the actions of the government,93 or, as conceded 
by the government in McMullen v. INS, on a group that the govern-
ment cannot or is unwilling to contro1.94 In McMullen, the court 
notes the government's concession "that persecution within the 
meaning of § 243(h) [an asylum claim] includes persecution by non-
governmental groups ... where it is shown that the government of 
the proposed country of deportation is unwilling or unable to con-
trol that group."95 
In an earlier case, Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,96 the petitioner 
entered the United States illegally and during his deportation hear-
ing filed an application for asylum. Bolanos-Hernandez had been a 
member of the Partido N acional de Reconciliacion, a right wing 
party in El Salvador, for two years. He had also been in the army 
and a member of the Escolta Militar, a voluntary civilian police 
squad that guards against guerrilla infiltration for the government.97 
After Bolanos-Hernandez left the army, he was approached by a 
guerrilla group to act as an informant. He refused. When Bolanos-
Hernandez refused to join the guerrillas they threatened to kill 
him. Bolanos-Hernandez took their threat seriously, having known 
the group to kill others who did not comply with their wishes.98 He 
based his claim for asylum in the United States on his desire to 
remain neutral in his country's civil war, that he did not want to 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 517. 
91 Id., citing Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985). 
92 Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985). 
93 Id. at 1397. This proposition is also supported in Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d 509, 517 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
94 McMullen V. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981) (rev'd on other grounds). 
95 Id. 
96 Bolanos-Hernandez V. INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984). 
97 Id. at 1318. 
98 Id. 
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Jom the Escolta Militar or the guerrilla forces. In this case, the 
circuit court ruled that a government may not look at the reasoning 
behind a person's political motivation: 99 
[a] rule that one must identify with one of two dominant warring 
political factions in order to possess a political opinion, when 
many persons may in fact, be opposed to views and policies of 
both, would frustrate one of the basic objectives of the Refugee 
Act of 1980-to provide protection to all victims of persecution 
regardless of ideology. 100 
Hernandez-Ortiz and Bolanos-Hernandez demonstrate that "political 
opinion" does not focus solely on the vocal public expressions of 
the applicant. The wider definition is that political opinion encom-
passes actions of the government as well, particularly whether the 
government restricts a person's privilege to hold a certain opinion. 
Whether an opinion is an expression of the dogma of a political 
party or not, should not be controlling in fulfilling the definition. 
More specifically, the Bolanos-Hernandez decision states that "the 
reasons underlying an individual's political choice are of no signif-
icance for purposes of [asylum and deportation claims] and the 
[U.S.] government may not inquire into them."lol 
In Desir v. Ilchert, District Director of INS, 102 also a Ninth Circuit 
case, the petitioner, a Haitian citizen, refused to yield to extortion 
forced upon fishermen by Haitian security forces (the Ton Ton 
Macoutes) in order to fish in certain waters. 103 From 1979 to 1981, 
Desir was arrested and tortured by the Ton Ton Macoutes on a 
number of occasions for failure to pay bribes to the group.104 While 
Desir was selling tables he had made at the waterfront, one of the 
Macoutes fired at him and threatened to shoot him if he was seen 
99 Id. at 1325. 
100 /d. "[Rlegardless of ideology" is a key phrase that must continue to be stressed in 
looking at what is considered political opinion. The BIA denied an applicant, who was an 
active member of a labor union in El Salvador, her appeal for asylum on the grounds that 
she had not supported her fear of persecution with objective evidence. Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 
730 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1984). This was overturned by the circuit court. Id. at 568. The 
BIA has denied that remaining neutral in a country engaged in civil war is political. Bolanos-
Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1319. This view has been rejected by the circuit court. Id. at 1326. 
Yet, the BIA determined that a Czech citizen who left Czechoslovakia because he disagreed 
with the communist system, but never publicly announced his opposition, was expressing a 
political opinion. See Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 I & N Dec. 866 (BIA 1968). 
101 Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1325 (1984). 
102 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988). 
103 Id. at 724. 
104 Id. at 724-25. 
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there again. 105 Desir moved to another county, only to find that he 
had to deal with the Ton Ton Macoutes there as well. In 1981 he 
came to the United States and applied for aslyum. 106 The Immigra-
tion Judge determined that Desir's testimony as to these events was 
credible and true, yet denied his request for asylum. 107 The BIA 
ruled that the actions of the Ton Ton Macoutes were not political, 
but were arbitrary personal actions undertaken independent of the 
Duvalier regime. lo8 The BIA also stated that Desir did not belong 
to any group which spoke out against the extortion carried on by 
the Macoutes and that therefore the Macoutes action against Desir 
was not on account of any political activity in which he had partic-
ipated. 109 
The Ninth Circuit overturned the BIA and ruled that "such 
actions were tactics whereby the Duvalier regime systematically ex-
ercised its authority by way of terror and intimidation. Although 
the results of extortion may have directly benefited the Macoutes 
as individuals, the intimidation and fear thereby engendered ac-
crued to the benefit of the Duvalier regime."llo Under this language, 
even if an event is deemed personally beneficial to its actor, if the 
ability to carry out the act comes from the power he receives from 
the existing government, or power gained through the govern-
ment's inability to stop its actions, the act is considered political. 
Desir v. Ilchert cites Lazo-Majano as support for the view that the 
treatment Desir received was motivated by political and not personal 
interests. II I 
The line of logic developing in these two cases brightens what 
has been a blurred line between what is considered to be personal 
and what is considered to be political. In Desir, the extortion bene-
fited not only the Ton Ton Macoutes, the "extortioners," but also 
the government that sanctions their activity. The government did 
not stop the Macoutes from forcing their bribes upon citizens, or 
from injuring them if they did not pay. This failure on the part of 
a government to protect its citizens, brings an event into the political 
realm. 
105 Id. at 725. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
J08 Id. 
109 Id. 
lJO Id. at 728. 
III Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit, in Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service,112 overruled the opinion of the BIA which held that people 
without overt political activity are unlikely to be victims of perse-
cution. ll3 The court, in overruling the BIA held that "citizens can 
be the focus of government persecution without ever taking any 
conventionally 'political' action at a11."1l4 
In Coriolan, petitioners Coriolan and Bonannee were citizens 
of Haiti. 115 Both feared death upon return to Haiti because of their 
illegal departure. 1l6 Coriolan left Haiti in fear of the Ton Ton 
Macoutes. ll7 He had a relative who had been murdered by the 
Macoutes for failing to give them a piece of cloth. I IS Coriolan, in 
his statement of facts, emphasized that in Haiti one does not have 
to actually do anything to the Macoutes to be afraid of them. llg 
Bonannee, though himself not politically active, had been arrested 
and held by the Ton Ton ·Macoutes. 120 Bonannee's father was sus-
pected of involvement in an anti-Duvalier movement.l2l As his son, 
Bonannee was also suspected. 122 
The Immigration Judge denied both men's petitions but the 
Fifth Circuit overruled. 123 The court, in an opinion by Judge Tuttle, 
held that: 
It could be argued that although Bonannee and Coriolan are 
likely victims of government persecution, what they face is not 
persecution for their 'political opinion' as the statute requires. 
We cannot believe, however, that Congress would have refused 
sanctuary to people whose misfortune it was to be the victims 
of a government which did not require political activity or opin-
ion to trigger its oppression. 124 
This case is evidence that the Fifth Circuit also has established 
precedent entitling refugees to political asylum as the result of 
actions against them by their government. The holding does not 
112 Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977). 
113 Id. at 944. 
114 Id. at 100l. 
115 Id. at 995. 
116 Id. at 996. 
117 Id. at 995. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 [d. at 996. 
121 Id. at 995. 
122 [d. at 996. 
123 Id. at 995. 
124 [d. at 1004. 
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state, and actually denies, the need for overt political action by the 
refugee. 125 Having established the above standards, the next section 
of this Note reviews the BIA and circuit court decisions in Lazo-
Majano and Campos-Guardado in light of these standards. 
III. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION ApPEALS AND CIRCUIT COURT 
ANALYSIS IN Lazo-Majano AND Campos-Guardado 
The Immigration Judge denied Campos-Guardado's claim of 
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 
The BIA believed that Campos-Guardado had been raped, and 
believed her account of the attack on the cooperative by the guer-
rillas, but denied her claim for asylum. 126 The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, concurred with the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals' administrative decision, that Campos-Guardado was "statu-
torily ineligible for a discretionary grant of asylum."127 The BIA 
stated that the rapes were not the result of Campos-Guardado's 
political opinion or a political opinion attributed to her by her 
attacker. 128 The BIA concluded that: 
[W]hile attackers may have been motivated by their own political 
goals, such as, for example, the intimidation of other peasants 
involved in land reform, the record does not establish that [Ms. 
Campos] was persecuted on account of any political opinion she 
herself possessed or was believed by the attackers to possess. 129 
The Circuit Court in its affirmation reasoned that the guerrillas 
could not have expected Campos-Guardado to be present at the 
cooperative, therefore, they could not have targeted her as a vic-
tim.130 
Although the Board of Immigration Appeals believed the truth 
of Campos-Guardado's story, it concluded that the threats Campos-
Guardado faced from her attacker were "personally-motivated to 
prevent her from exposing his identity-and that there was 'no 
indication he maintained an interest in her because of her political 
opinion or any other grounds specified in the ACt."'131 The Circuit 
125 Id. 
126 Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1987). 
127 Id. at 290. 
128 Id. See supra section D(2). A "political opinion" can be an opinion attributed to the 
victim by the persecutor. 
129 Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 288. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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Court supported the Board of Immigration Appeal's reasoning, and 
concluded that the persecution of Campos-Guardado was not on 
account of a political opinion which she possessed or "was believed 
by the attacker to possess."132 The court dismissed the appeal by 
categorizing the incident as one of general violence for a country 
in civil strife. 133 
In her appeal, Campos-Guardado argued that her family's as-
sociation with the reform movement and her position as an eyew-
itness to the political assassination of her uncle and cousin would 
subject her to future persecution in El Salvador.134 Campos-Guar-
dado argued that it was "unreasonable for the Board to assume that 
the persecutor's reasons for victimizing her were different from 
their political motivations behind the torture, execution and rape 
of her family members."135 Campos-Guardado also claimed that 
because of her presence at her uncle's house, a political opinion was 
being imputed to her and that this was the same as if she had held 
the opinion herself. 136 
In the Lazo-Majano case, the BIA again found that "'the evi-
dence attests to mistreatment of an individual, not persecution."'137 
The BIA stated that it was not unsympathetic with Lazo-Majano's 
situation but that, "as already discussed, the respondent's terrible 
personal mistreatment at the hands of this one individual does not 
constitute 'persecution' or 'a threat to life or freedom' for reasons 
enumerated in this ACt."138 The BIA went on to say that "such 
personal abuse does not constitute persecution."139 The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overruled the BIA. The Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that rape is a form of persecution. 140 The court stated 
mId. at 289. 
mId. at 290. Yet, even though the court in Campos-Guardado stated that Campos-
Guardado's situation was not political, it cited Young v. United States Department of Justice, 
INS, 759 F.2d 450, 456 (1985) as implying that a "father's showing that he would be subject 
to harm because of his son's political activities is relevant evidence to show a well-founded 
fear of persecution"; and Bahramnia v. INS, 782 F.2d 1243, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986), to show 
that "membership in a group that is singled out for persecution because of political beliefs 
is relevant to showing likelihood of persecution ... should the alien be deported." Campos-
Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1987). 
134 Id. at 288. 
135 Id. at 289. 
136 Id. at 288. 
137 Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987). The Board of Immigration 
Appeals is referring to the Refugee Act of 1980. 
138 In re: Olimpia Lazo-Majano, Board of Immigration Appeals. Unpublished Decision at 
2 (5/9/85). 
139 !d. at 3. 
140 Cited in Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1434. 
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that the political opinion of the victim can be the political opinion 
as seen by the persecutor. 141 In other words, for a victim to fear 
persecution on account of political opinion, the political opinion 
does not have to be her own, it can be imputed to her by the 
persecutor. The court stated that victims of persecution can be 
people who are nonparticipants in the persecutor's goals, and that 
their silence to the persecutors represents hostility. 142 The reasoning 
in Lazo-Majano for the determination that persecution had occurred 
on account of political opinion is unique to the case law. The court 
determined that: 
Zuniga is asserting the political opinion that a man has a right 
to dominate and he has persecuted Olimpia through force to 
accept this opinion without rebellion. Zuniga told Olimpia that 
in his treatment of her he was seeking revenge. But Olimpia 
knew of no injury she had ever done Zuniga. His statement 
reflects a much more generalized animosity to the opposite sex, 
an assertion of a political aspiration and the desire to suppress 
opposition to it. Olimpia was not permitted by Zuniga to hold 
an opinion to the contrary. When by flight, she asserted one, 
she became exposed to persecution for her assertion. 143 
The Lazo-Majano decision notes that had Olimpia Lazo-Majano 
stayed in EI Salvador and reported the rape, it is likely that Zuniga 
would have been allowed to carry out his threats of killing her.144 
The decision concludes that as a matter of law, the abuses suffered 
by Lazo-Majano constitute a political opinion. 145 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. When is an Action "Political" 
In the Desir case, the Haitian government was unable to control 
(or chose not to control) the extortion by the Ton Ton Macoutes of 
141 [d. at 1435. 
142 [d. at 1435, citing Bolanos-Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
749 F.2d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985). 
143 [d. at 1435. 
144 [d. 
145 [d. at 1436; The dissent in Law-Majano strongly disagreed with the majority opinion 
that Lazo-Majano's claim was a fear of persecution based on political opinion. The dissent 
claimed that "[q]uite simply, the majority has outdone Lewis Carroll in its application of the 
term political opinion and in finding that male domination in such a personal relationship 
constitutes political persecution." [d. at 1437. Judge Poole in the dissent goes on to say that 
Lazo-Majano's "peril lay in Zuniga'S unrestrained carnal appetites and his total conception 
of her as an available sexual object" and of her beliefs that he might be able to make trouble 
for her. [d. at 1439. This, he concluded, has no political connection. [d. 
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its citizens. 146 The Desir court cites the government's concession in 
McMullen for the proposition that the persecution of the asylum 
applicant does not necessarily have to be done by the government 
to be considered political, but can be done by a group which the 
government cannot control.147 Hernandez-Ortiz supports McMullen 
by stating that '''persecution' occurs only when there is a difference 
between the persecutor's views or status and that of the victim; it is 
oppression which is inflicted on groups or individuals because of a 
difference that the persecutor will not tolerate."148 The Hernandez-
Ortiz court stated that in considering this, it is important to look at 
the motivation of the persecutor to determine whether the situation 
is political.149 It is the relationship between the persecutor and the 
victim which determines whether threats or violence constitute po-
litical persecution, not just whether the court, or adjudicating body, 
thinks that the victim has been "politically active" in a public sense. 150 
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has stated in Coriolan that a 
person can be a "victim of a government which did not require 
political activity or opinion to trigger its oppression."151 The above 
illustrates that case law precedent establishes that a victim of per-
secution need not be "politically active" to suffer persecution on 
account of political opinion and that persecution by the government 
includes groups the government is unable to control. I52 
In Lazo-Majano and Campos-Guardado the BIA found that the 
two women were not expressing political opinions of their own and 
146 Id. Desir v. IIchert, 840 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1988). 
147 Id. at 728 n.5 (citing McMullen v. INS 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
148 Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. Note that in the following cases the victim's desire to remain neutral in a country 
of political upheaval, the desire not to be politically outspoken, was enough for a grant of 
asylum "on account of" political opinion. In Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407 (1985), the 
petitioner's decision to remain neutral in EI Salvadoran political conflict constituted expres-
sion of a political opinion for purposes of determining whether he was entitled to political 
asylum. In Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1987), Turcios was arrested by 
police and accused of being involved in leftist politics. He was tortured and released two 
months later. Id. at 1399. He disclaimed any involvement with politics or "guerrilla insur-
gency".Id. at 1401. The Ninth Circuit granted asylum citing his desire to remain neutral as 
political opinion. Id. In Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1988), the petitioner 
was threatened by four men who accused him of being a member of the guerrilla organization 
FPL. Id. at 1395-96. The court determined that death squads have the ability to carry out 
threats and that petitioner wanted to remain neutral. Asylum was granted. In Arteaga v. 
INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1988), Arteaga was threatened with conscription 
and kidnapping by the guerrillas if he did not agree to join them voluntarily. He chose to 
remain neutral. Asylum was granted. 
151 Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 1004 (5th Cir. 1977). 
152 McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1315 n.2; Desir, 840 F.2d at 728. 
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therefore were not eligible for asylum. 153 Accepting the above case 
law, one may argue that rape is analogous to the situation in a case 
such as Desir. What is being extorted in a case such as Campos-
Guardado or Lazo-Majano is not money, as in Desir, but sex. 154 Cam-
pos-Guardado, who was raped by members of a Guerrilla group, 
was not a "politically active" woman. But, she need not be, according 
to the doctorine expressed in Corioian, to meet the requirements of 
the Refugee Act. 
Fear is instilled by torturing people in many different ways. In 
the Campos-Guardado case, all the people present in the household 
at the agrarian cooperative were taken out to the farm pit. 155 The 
men were killed and the women were raped. 156 The BIA, and hence 
the Fifth Circuit in its compliance, determined that the rapist's 
threats to Campos-Guardado were personal to keep her from re-
vealing his identity. 157 In doing so they have refused to acknowledge 
the deliberateness in the form of torture chosen for each group. 
The guerrillas chopped the men's bodies with machetes. They did 
not do this to the women. They chose to rape them. In El Salvador, 
guerrilla groups and the military threaten citizens to reinforce their 
power and control. 
A key point made in Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS is that in determin-
ing whether an action is one of political persecution, the issue is 
"the relationship between the two,"158 the victim and the persecutor. 
The issue of rape is one of power and control. In the context of 
life in El Salvador, Lazo-Majano or Campos-Guardado's decision 
not to speak out against their persecutors did constitute a political 
choice. 159 Their decision to "turn in" their rapists, thereby speaking 
15S See Appendix C to Petition for Certiorari, Campos-Guardado (86-1969); Lazo-Majano, 
813 F.2d at 1433-44. 
154 Desir v. lIchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1988). 
155 Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1987). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 288. 
158 Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 516. 
159 The Ninth Circuit opinion in Lazo-Majano discusses the inequitable power relationship 
between Zuniga and Lazo-Majano, but it does not fully discuss the implications of this 
situation or why it is important to recognize this imbalance. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 
1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit states that the rapist is asserting a political 
opinion that a man has a right to dominate a woman. /d. The court then constructs its 
decision around case law showing that for an opinion to be political it does not necessarily 
have to be the true political opinion of the victim, it can be an opinion that the victim is 
perceived to have. Id. at 1434-36. The court stated that the rapist's political opinion is 
domination of women, and that the political opinion Lazo-Majano is perceived to have is that 
of a subversive. Id. at 1435. This perception comes from Zuniga's public denounciation of 
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out against the rape, would not have been accepted in El Salvador. 
If the women chose to expose their rapists both would probably 
have had no protection against the threats of murder given by their 
persecutors. The women could have been killed for speaking out 
against the structure of power. 160 
B. Critique of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
The BIA fails to adequately recognize the humanitarian foun-
dation underlying the Refugee Act of 1980. The Immigration 
Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals have not reasoned 
consistently in cases before them. 161 There is severe discrimination 
among applicants, many more applications are accepted from com-
munist countries, and less so from countries whose governments 
are supported by the United States. 162 The total approval rate for 
Lazo-Majano as a subversive. Id. The missing link in this argument is that Lazo-Majano held 
a political opinion when she did not want to accept Zuniga'S view that a man has a right to 
dominate a woman through rape. Although the Ninth Circuit states the assertion, it does not 
make a clear connection between Lazo-Majano's attempt to stop the rape and a political 
opinion of her own, the opinion that she refuses to accept the sexual control Zuniga is forcing 
on her. 
160 For example, in El Salvador, a woman was captured and raped by a member of the 
military. The man told her family that if they reported the incident or did not cooperate, he 
would denounce the family as subversives. The family reported the incident to the authorities. 
The authorities laughed and gave them no protection. Comments by panelist, Immigrant 
Rape: Promoting Threat or Fear of Sexual Repression as a Reason for Granting Asylum, Women and 
the Law Conference, March 1989 [hereinafter Conference] (tape on file at the offices of the 
Boston College Third World Law Journal). 
161 See supra note 74 contrasting Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions. 
162 Several articles reviewing the implementation of the Refugee Act of 1980 say that it 
has not totally cured the ideological analysis given to asylum applications. See, e.g., Gibney, 
supra note 56, at 114-117. Gibney suggests that one would expect a connection between the 
level of human rights violations in a country and the number of applicants from that country 
granted asylum. He states that there is still an ideological bias in the United States asylum 
policy despite the Refugee Act of 1980 and instead, "assistance should first be provided to 
those facing the most serious human rights abuses." Id. at 114. Helton, Political Asylum Under 
the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243 (1984). Helton com-
ments that the Immigration Judges need to be recruited from outside as well as inside the 
ranks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. "Traditionally, immigration judges 
have come from the ranks of the INS." Id. at 262. He also states that Immigration Judges 
should be "instructed in the law and history of human rights and refugees." Id. His final 
suggestion is that the State Department should not be involved in deciding whether the alien 
has a well founded fear of persecution. Id. at 263. To make the implementation of the 
Refugee Act more effective Helton states that "the Refugee Act requires the depoliticization 
of the asylum process [and] the recognition of the uniform protocol standard .... " Id. at 
264 (referring to the United Nations standards which acted as the background for the 
Refugee Act). Heyman, Redefining Refugee: A Proposal for Relief For the Victims of Civil Strife, 
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449 (1987). Heyman suggests that relief for victims of civil strife is 
not included in the statute. The contrived definition of refugee, that a person must have a 
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asylum cases filed with District Directors between June, 1983, and 
September, 1986, was 23.3%.163 The five countries at the top of the 
list had approvals at a rate much higher than the average. Citizens 
of Iran had 60.4% of their applications accepted, Romania 51.0%, 
Czechoslovakia 45.4%, Afghanistan 37.7% and Poland 34.0%. The 
three countries at the lowest end of the scale were El Salvador, 
Haiti, and Guatemala with 2.6%, 1.8%, and 0.9% respectively.164 
In more general terms, the INS does what it can to discourage 
certain classes of people from applying for asylum, and takes mea-
sures to see that particular nationals are kept ignorant of asylum 
possibilities and availability of counsel to help obtain those rights. 165 
Courts have stepped in to set rulings for discriminatory practices 
of the INS and Immigration Judges. 166 In Orantes-Hernandez v. 
Meese, a class of El Salvadorans taken into custody by the INS 
challenged INS policies regarding their treatment. 167 Salvadorans 
were not being told of the possibility of applying for asylum, were 
forced into signing voluntary statements of departure, and were 
kept in confinement without access to attorneys. 168 The district court 
ruled that the INS practices discriminate against El Salvadoran 
asylum applicants by denying them due process and imposing a 
higher burden of proof for establishing fear of persecution. 169 
In 1982, a group of Haitian refugees filed a class action suit 
because not one asylum grant had been made in their district. 170 In 
well founded fear of persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a social group or political opinion, prohibits including these victims. Id. at 449-50. He 
suggests that the role politics plays in asylum adjudications, can cause humanitarian concerns 
to be frequently overlooked. Id. at 456. Heyman proposes that under an amendment the 
definition of refugee in the Refugee Act of 1980 should be expanded to explicitly include 
victims of civil strife. Id. at 451. Note, The Need For A Codified Definition of "Persecution" in 
United States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV. 187 (1986) (authored by Sophie Pirie). Pirie 
focuses on the varying ways officials define (or do not define) persecution. "[U]ncertainty 
concerning the definition of persecution induces INS and judicial uncertainty about asylum 
and deportation withholding requirements and disparate treatment of similar aliens." Id. at 
190. 
163 Asylum Cases Filed with INS District Directors Approved and Denied, By Selected Nationalities, 
REFUGEE REPORTS, December 16, 1988. 
164 Id. 
165 Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese et aI., 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1494-98 (C.D. Cal 1988). 
166 See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 451 (1980) aff'd as modified 
sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982); Orantes-Hernandez 
v. Meese et aI., 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988). 
167 Id. at 1490. 
168 Id. at 1494-95. 
169 Id. at 1506-1508. 
170 See Haitian Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1026. 
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this case, the court set guidelines for the Immigration Judges to 
follow. 
Highlighting the humanitarian aspects of the Refugee Act itself 
is not enough to convince the BIA to accept an argument for why 
rape is a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political 
opinion. The language in the case law discussed above and the 
legislative history favor depicting rape as a form of persecution. It 
is hard to understand how the father of a politically active son to 
whom no specific threats have even been made can be said to have 
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his son's opin-
ion, 17l while the BIA can claim that repeated rape of an individual 
is not "persecution within the meaning of the Act."172 The Immi-
gration Judges and BIA as a group, are not objective bodies of 
adjudication. 173 Acknowledging that the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals is inconsistent in applying the principles of the Refugee Act 
in accordance with the humanitarian guidelines is one step, but 
there is more going on in the BIA's analysis of sexual abuse cases 
than these general inconsistencies. 
It appears from the decision in Lazo-Majano and Campos-Guar-
dado that the Board of Immigration Appeals is unable to place rape 
in the same category as persecution and political opinion because 
they are unable to see and understand the situation of women. 174 
171 Young v. INS, 759 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1985). 
172 Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987). 
173 A recent study by Deborah Anker discusses an empirical investigation of asylum 
procedures. Anker, Executive Summary: Determining Asylum Claims in the United States, An 
Empirical Study of the Adjudication of Asylum Claims before the Immigration Court, January 1990 
(unpublished) (on file at the offices of the Boston College Third World Law Journal). Anker 
states that "the principal conclusion of this study is that the current adjudicatory system 
remains one of ad hoc rules and standards." Id. at 2. The study suggests that the "ideologically 
blind determination process mandated by Congress" has not been achieved. Id. at 4. Fur-
thermore it was shown that immmigration judges as a group do not consider "evidence of 
human rights and persecutory practices in the home country in determining merits of an 
asylum claim." Id. at 4. The study also concluded that immigration judges often inappro-
priately impose their own cultural and political assumptions in assessing an applicant's cred-
ibility.Id. 
174 A project in El Paso Texas set up by American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) 
to monitor the sexual abuse of women by border officals shows that women crossing the 
border are met by agents and asked their phone numbers, marital status and if they have 
children. The agents ask the women to go out with them. A refusal can deny entry for these 
women, most of whom perform domestic work in the United States. Sometimes the women 
are raped. U.S. Mexico Report, Vol 7, No.4, April 1988, and from a conversation with an 
AFSC staff member in El Paso, Tx. The INS (the information giving body) and the Immi-
gration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals (the adjudicatory bodies) are intertwined. 
All three are part of the United States Department of Justice. The Immigration Judge and 
the Board of Immigration Appeals are under the Executive Office for Immigration Review. 
1990] POLITICAL ASYLUM: RAPE 377 
Legal doctrines as we have learned them, are ill equipped to deal 
with the issues concerning the domination and dis empowerment of 
women. The domination of women has been perpetuated by the 
legal rules, but the rules are not the "source of society's subjection 
ofwomen."175 The rule, the Refugee Act of 1980, sets the standard 
for granting asylum to refugees whose human rights have been 
violated. Rape is a violation of a woman's human right in any social 
and political context. To recognize the humanitarian purpose of 
the Refugee Act as a legal argument will not eliminate the bias in 
the adjudicating body. Attempting to use the humanitarian basis of 
the Refugee Act to get the BIA beyond its sexist decisions will not 
work because using legal rules, to disengage sexism, "would [only 
be helpful] if sexism were a legal error."176 
Inequalities in the law do not exist because of a mistake in a 
legal process sense of analyzing the principles of law. The roots of 
sexism are deeper. 
[MJale dominance is perhaps the most pervasive and tenacious 
system of power in history ... it is metaphysically nearly perfect. 
Its point of view is the standard for point-of-viewlessness, its 
particularity the meaning of universality. Its force is exercised 
as consent, its authority as participation, its supremacy as the 
paradigm of order, its control as the definition of legitimacy. 177 
Laws and their interpretations have not escaped being defined 
through the male lens. "[T]he state, in part through law, institu-
tionalizes male power."178 The male epistemological stance is objec-
tivity, and sexual objectivity is the "primary process of the subjection 
of women."179 
We live in a world where sexuality organizes culture, and sex-
uality is a form of power. 180 In a world where speaking out against 
It is the INS that is the defendant in claims for asylum, therefore the Department of Justice 
is the defendant in the same claims it is attempting to adjudicate. To further complicate 
matters, the Immigration Judges are often appointed from the ranks of the INS. Helton, 
supra note 162, at 243. Thejudges receive no special training in human rights concerns. This 
means that decisions as to whether rape is persecution are being made by the same agency 
which apparently has done nothing about alleged sexual harassment of aliens within its own 
agency. 
175 A. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1382 
(1986). 
176 [d. 
177 MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward a Feminist jurisprudence, 
8 SIGNS 635, 638-39 (1983). 
178 [d. at 645. 
179 [d. 
180 MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 
515, 533 (1983). 
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a rapist can mean death, women are left with little choice but to 
endure the persecution of the rapist. This acquiescence leads the 
Immigration Judge to label the incident a personal relationship. 
Rejecting the definition of women as a thing to be objectified 
through sexual torture, is rejecting a theory of the state that allows 
that power and control. 181 Legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon 
states that: "Women's acceptance of their condition does not con-
tradict its fundamental unacceptability if women have little choice 
but to become persons who freely choose women's roles. 182 For this 
reason, the reality of women's oppression is, finally, neither de-
monstrable nor refutable empirically."183 
Lazo-Majano's acquiescence to Zuniga does not mean that she 
accepted what was happening to her, nor that she was involved in 
a personal relationship with him as is suggested by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. 184 Her "acceptance of [her] condition" was 
an effort to keep herself alive while fighting for a way to change 
the situation. It is necessary to "uncover and claim as valid the 
experience of women, the major content of which is the devalidation 
of women's experience."185 The Immigration Judges, through their 
own cultural biases, are devaluing women's experience of being 
raped. This point of view is encouraged by the way rape is perceived 
in the United States. 
In the United States, laws are fashioned to make it difficult for 
a woman to prove that she has been raped. For example, the sta-
tutory laws in the United States regarding rape focus on the wom-
an's consent to the interaction and how much force she used to 
resist. 186 Thus, the laws focus on the victim, not the actions of the 
rapist. 187 Legally in the situation of rape, "no" does not mean "no" 
unless some other type of rejection, i.e. force, is also present. 188 
Of ten, judges in the United States are predisposed to place "blame" 
on a victim of rape: she asked for it, she was provocatively dressed, 
IBI Note that in the Campos-Guardado case the men who were at the agricultural co-op 
were killed by guerillas opposing their work. The women were raped, not killed, for being 
part of the same agricultural cooperative. To exert control over men, the men were killed. 
To exert control over women, the women were raped. See Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 
287. . 
IB2 Women's roles being defined as the traditional view of women as being submissive. 
IB3 MacKinnon, supra note 180, at 542. 
IB4 Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1987). 
IB5 MacKinnon, supra note 177, at 638. 
IB6 See generally Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (\986). 
IB7 [d. at 1099. 
IBB [d. at 1105-1121. 
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or she knew the man. The perception that rape is a woman's fault 
is well documented in contemporary writings. 189 This perception of 
negating the horror of and unwillingness on the part of the women 
in rape, carries itself into the law. It is this same perception that 
Immigration and Board of Immigration Appeals Judges are bring-
ing to their analysis of human rights violations involving rape. They 
place blame on the women involved and cannot conceive of women 
rejecting rape and the control it represents. Yet in analogous or 
lesser situations of torture asylum is granted. 190 
Women are injured by rape. In a country where the abuse is 
systemic, there is no relief. Whether or not the BIA agrees with the 
"political choice" of an applicant should not affect the outcome of 
the case. 191 The reasoning behind an individual's political choices 
should not be inquired into by the government in response to an 
asylum claim. 192 The court states that it is improper to "look behind 
the manifestation of an alien's political opinion ... motives fre-
quently will be both complex and difficult to ascertain; it may not 
be possible to separate the political from the non-political as-
pects."193 People's politics are formed by what affects them person-
ally. What the Immigration Judge is considering personal, is political 
to women. 
The consciousness of the Immigration Judges needs to be 
raised to recognize the deliberateness in using rape as a form of 
control which in itself is political. No country in the world is free 
from rape whether vast human rights violations are occurring in it 
or not. A woman is not necessarily safe from rape even if she comes 
to the United States. Nevertheless, in a country where human rights 
violations have been documented, rape is often used as a conscious 
189 See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL, MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE, (1975); 
Estrich, supra note 186; MacKinnon, supra note 177. These are just a sampling of sources. 
As an example of the types of statements giving women the responsibility for being raped, 
a modern day physician said, "There is one type of woman I would have a hard time believing 
was raped: a woman between 16 and 25 on the pill and no longer a virgin." Mills, One 
Hundred Years of Fear, Rape and the Medical Profession, JUDGE LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF, 
WOMEN GENDER ROLES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Raftner & Stanko, eds. 1982). 
190 In re: Mohammed Osman Mohibi, Unpublished BIA Decision (7/27/87) (card-carrying 
member of the Hizbeh Islami in Afghanistan feared persecution because his father and 
brother had been arrested and imprisoned.) Id. at 3. In re: Mejia Flores, Unpublished BIA 
Decision (6/21188) (conscientious objector who did not want to serve in the military and 
feared for his safety was granted asylum). Id. at 7-8. 
191 Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1984). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
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form of persecution. 194 Thus, if there is no effective prosecutorial 
system available to a woman in the country where the rape has 
occurred,195 or if her life is endangered by bringing the issue to the 
attention of the authorities, then the applicant has a well founded 
fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The task in reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals' de-
cisions is to articulate what the "on account of" phrase means and 
to establish guidelines for the Board of Immigration Appeals and 
Immigration Judges to follow in reviewing asylum claims involving 
sexual abuse. Because the Attorney General's ability to grant asylum 
is discretionary, it is difficult to overrule. But guidelines can be set. 
There are two simple guidelines that the reviewing agency adjudi-
cators could follow to help reduce bias in their decisions. 
1. Accept that rape is a form of persecution, and thus a violation 
of human rights. 
2. To determine if a victim has a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of political opinion, consider if there is a 
system for redress against her attacker, just as if a victim had 
been beaten up and threatened with death. If there is no system 
for a woman to prosecute in her country where the rape has 
occurred or if she did prosecute or bring the issue to the au-
thorities her life would be in danger, then the woman should 
be granted asylum. 
The precedent for determining that rape ens tills a well-
founded fear of persecution is in the case law and within the mean-
ing of the statute. The problem at the agency level is the inability 
of the adjudicators to get beyond their own biased definitions. It is 
important for guidelines to be implemented so that women who are 
tortured through rape receive the same type of consideration in 
their asylum claims as those suffering from other forms of perse-
cution. 
Maureen Mulligan 
194 An expert witness testifying at an asylum hearing for an EI Salvadoran applicant 
stated that she has interviewed a number of security members and former security police in 
EI Salvador. The information she received in her interviews included information that one 
of the patterns of the death squad activities is to seek out young women and then rape and 
kill them. Conference, supra note 160. 
195 For example, the fact that there has "never been a successful prosecution and 
conviction of any member of the Salvadoran security forces for political violence and human 
rights abuses against civilians," Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (C.D. 
Cal. 1988), is an example of the lack of a system available for prosecution. 
